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Abstract
This chapter studies the impacts of short-term interest rates of United States and
emerging markets risk premia as external factors on Turkish short-term interest
rates and daily exchange rates during the period of January 2011–December 2018.
Following Edwards and Borensztein et al., we construct a vector autoregressive
(VAR) model with the domestic short-term interest rates, exchange rate against the
US Dollar, the US interest rates and iShares MSCI emerging markets ETF. Hereby,
we intend to shed some light on the reaction of Turkish interest rates and exchange
rates to the short-term US interest rates and emerging markets instability. As other
emerging countries, Turkey is rather economically and politically unstable country.
Even a little political development may cause a serious volatility in the market. For
that reason, in this study we specifically examine the periods that are known as
politically stressed times and tranquil periods separately to see how external factors’
behaviors change during shock periods.
Keywords: interest rate contagion, exchange rate, VAR model, financial crisis,
emerging markets
1. Introduction
The risk exposures from the US during the 2007–2009 financial crisis spread
rapidly to the global financial markets and gradually increased its severity while the
great number of banks bankrupted due to increase in interest rates. The major role
for the bankruptcies of the banks in European countries was the domino effect of
the spread of interest rate risk in the interbank market and liquidity risk (e.g.,
[1, 2]). Since the liquidity risks correspond to counterparty risk, the idiosyncratic
credit problems arising from the US subprime mortgage market spread rapidly to
other countries through the channels of changes in interest rate (e.g., [2–5]).
Brunnermeier and Pedersen [3] empirically show that increase in interest rates
affect the financial institutions that have liquidity problems as those institutions are
more open to risk contagion arising from the interest rate rise. “For this reason,
banks, which carry interbank credit risk threats, are exposed to liquidity risks and
such a systemic risk contagion causes subsequent bankruptcies (see e.g., [6–11])”
([12], p. 243).
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Even though the existing literature mainly addresses the issues such as risk
contagion across stock markets or foreign exchange markets due to counterparty
relationships, macroeconomic risk or financial linkages; how interest rate risk prop-
agates around global financial markets is not fully investigated (e.g., [10, 13–15]). As
interest rates can be used domestically to absorb the external shocks and to balance
the currency, the propagation of the interest rate risks between financial markets
gains much more importance for economically semi- and fully open countries.
How foreign interest rates and the exchange rates affect the domestic interest
rates can be shown with the following equation:
it ¼ i ∗t þ Etetþ1  et þ pit (1)
where it is the domestic interest rate with maturity t + 1; i ∗t is the foreign interest
rates with the same maturity; et is the natural logarithm of the spot exchange rate at
time t; and pit is the country risk premium. According to this, every shock to i ∗ or pi
can be absorbed by changes in domestic interest rates and changes in the expected
rate of depreciation. Therefore, it is possible to say that under floating exchange rate
regime, policy makers have freedom to increase or decrease the domestic interest
rates to adjust the exchange rate. For example, “a positive shock to i ∗ or pi may
cause an immediate devaluation of the exchange rate which overshoots its long-run
equilibrium and tends to appreciate (or reduce its rate of depreciation)” ([16], p. 7).
In other words, under floating exchange rate regime, flexible exchange rate can
absorb external shocks.
According to Edwards [17], the interest rate spread, which can be defined as the
difference between lending and riskless rates, is a key transmission channel for
interest rate risk propagation (e.g., [5, 18–20]). Borensztein et al. [21] examine the
impact of international interest rate shocks and emerging market risk premia on
domestic interest rates and exchange rates for both emerging and developed coun-
tries. The authors find different results for Latin American and Asian economies
and for different exchange rate regimes. According to that in Mexico and Argen-
tina, emerging market risk premia significantly affects the interest rates. On the
other hand, the Asian countries show different reactions according to their
exchange rate regimes; Singapore which has a floating exchange rate regime seems
unaffected by the external shocks while Hong Kong responses significantly to the
emerging market risk premia.
There are more recent papers that investigate the impacts of external shocks for
various countries. In Ref. [22], Demirel investigates the impulse responses of the
Turkish economy to the US interest rate shocks. The study reveals that Turkey is
less sensitive to the interest rate shocks while she has lower levels of external debt.
Therefore, the author concludes that the foreign interest rate shocks depend on the
level of external debt for small-open economies. Allegret et al. [23] examine the
relative importance of external shocks in domestic fluctuations for East Asian
countries. Using a structural VARmodel, the authors show that real oil price and the
US GDP shocks have significant impacts on domestic activity. They also reveal that
since the mid-1990s, external shocks have rising impacts on domestic variables in
those countries. Using a trend-cycle VAR model, Andrle et al. [24] investigate how
external factors affect the Poland’s domestic variables. According to that, the
authors reach the conclusion that about 50% of Poland’s output and interest rate
variance and about 25% of the variance of inflation can be explained with shocks
from Euro zone. Pelipas et al. [25] test the significance of Russia’s GDP and oil prices
as the external factors on Belarus’ economy. Using generalized impulse response
functions, the authors show that oil prices have strong and negative impact on the
economy while Russia’s GDP does not have that strong impact.
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This chapter is motivated to some extent by the earlier work of Edwards [26]
and Borensztein et al. [21]. Therefore, following those studies, in this study, I aim to
construct a vector auto regression (VAR) model to examine the effect of external
shocks on Turkish short-term interest rates and the exchange rate. Differently from
Edwards [26] and Borensztein et al. [21] and the more recent papers, I investigate
how the impact of external shocks change according to tranquil and politically
stressed periods as Turkey is a rather politically instable country and this situation
causes authorities to interfere with the floating exchange rate regime every now
and then.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents data we use to analyze
the impacts of external shocks on the Turkish short-term interest rates and the
exchange rate; and the VAR model under Section 2.2. Section 3 reports the estima-
tion results according to full period, each politically stressed periods and the polit-
ically tranquil periods. Finally, the wrap up of the results and conclusions are
offered in Section 4.
2. Data and methodology
2.1 Data
The time period, in this study, is determined as January 2011–December 2018.
Turkey has been governed by one political party since 2002. Therefore, the period
from 2002 to today can be counted as a rather politically stable period for Turkey.
However, in our study we do not want to include the first 5 years of the AKP (The
Justice and Development Party) governments as this period can be counted as the
rebalancing and redevelopment period after the heavy financial crisis of 2001.
Furthermore, as during the years between 2007 and 2010, global financial crisis
may have a dominant role on the markets instead of local developments, we do not
include this period into our study too. Therefore, the period that we decide to
examine, 2011–2018, solely shows us the impact of external factors change on the
short-term interest rates and the daily exchange rates according to politically
stressed times or tranquil periods.
In this study, 3-months interbank rates are used as the short-term interest rates.
To be able to assess how group of emerging countries affect Turkish domestic
interest rates and the exchange rates, daily iShares MSCI emerging markets ETF is
used as the proxy of the emerging market risk premia (difference between return of
a risky asset and the risk-free rate). Finally for the exchange rate, daily spot
exchange rate against the US Dollar is used. Therefore, our data set includes daily
3-months interbank interest rates for Turkey and the US, daily iShares MSCI
emerging markets ETF and daily spot exchange rate against the US Dollar for
Turkish Lira.
Data set covers the period January 1, 2011–December 31, 2018 for a total of 2087
daily observations and is downloaded from Bloomberg Terminal. Figure 1 repre-
sents the graphs of each group of data for the examined period.
In Figure 1, the first graph presents how USD/TRY exchange rate changes
between 2011 and 2019. Second and third graphs present the pattern of short-term
interest rates for USA and Turkey between 2011 and 2019. The final graph shows
how emerging market risk premium changes during the 2011–2019 period.
To be able to determine the politically stressed times that have significant
impacts on the financial markets of Turkey, we identify the financial stress periods.
For this purpose, we first identify the anomalies on the daily price changes on Borsa
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Istanbul. We define the anomalies as 5% or above drop on the main index of Borsa
Istanbul in total in at least 5 days period.
Financial markets experience either a crash or a bear market. The widely used
criteria for a crash is 10% drop from the peak prices in 1 or 2 days and a drop of at
least 20% off peak prices in a wider time period for the bear market. While identi-
fying the price anomalies in Turkish market, we consider both of those criteria. To
be able to decide on the exact drop rate, we examine the sharp drops in Borsa
Istanbul for 20 years period. During that period, the average correction rate for the
market is calculated as 3.7%. Therefore to able to identify a price movement as an
anomaly, we need to determine a rate above this rate. However, as we do not want
to keep that rate as high as a rate that is needed to classify the drop as a stock crash,
we identify 5% and above rates as price anomalies. Finally, as we determine that
Borsa Istanbul shows the strongest reactions to negative events or news in the first
5 days on average, we decide on the 5 days criterion.
After the examination of the daily price changes of Borsa Istanbul from 2011 till
2019, we identify eight different periods that BIST100 lose at least 5% in total in at
least 5 days.
Following the identification of the financial stress periods, we identify the
domestic political developments that occur on the same periods. These are;
• 10 days period which starts with the early retirement request of commanders
of Turkish Army on 29th July 2011,
• 3 weeks period which starts with Gezi Park incidents on 28th May 2013,
• 1 month period which starts with the operation of FETO terror organization to
government authorities on 17th December 2013,
• 10 days period which starts on 31st July 2014 prior to presidential election,
Figure 1.
Exchange rates in Turkey, interest rates in Turkey and the US and emerging markets risk premia (2011–2019).
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• the period which starts with the 7th June 2015 general elections and continues
until the announcement of new elections on 25th August 2015,
• 2 weeks period which starts with the shootdown of Russian plane on Turkish
border on 24th November 2015,
• 2 weeks period which starts with the military coup attempt on 15th July 2016,
• 3 months period which starts with the announcement of new cabinet on 2nd
July 2018 and strengthens with Pastor Branson’s house arrest and ends with
Brunson’s return to USA.
To be able to show the relation between short-term interest rates of USA, short-
term interest rates of Turkey and USD/TRY exchange rate, we prepare Figure 2.
Although the figure does not allow us to statistically prove the correlation between
the US interest rates, Turkish interest rates and USD/TRY exchange rate; it is still
possible to see that especially in the latter period (after 2017) short-term interest
rates of USA, short-term interest rates of Turkey and USD/TRY share significant
common pattern.
Figure 2 presents the graphs of the short-term interest rates for both US and
Turkey and the USD/TRY exchange rate for the 2011–2019 period.
Differently from Figure 2, Figure 3 brings emerging risk premia and short-term
interest rates of Turkey and USD/TRY exchange rate together to show whether
Turkish risky assets and emerging markets risk premia share common pattern
during the examined period.
Figure 3 presents the graphs of iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF, Turkish
short-term interest rate and USD/TRY exchange rate for the 2011–2019 period.
2.2 Methodology
In this chapter, to be able to examine the effect of US interest rates and emerging
market risk premia on the domestic short-term interest rate of Turkey and
exchange rate against the US Dollar, we construct a vector auto regression (VAR)
model. More specifically, the model includes the Turkish short-term interest rate,
the US short-term interest rate, the natural logarithm of the exchange rate against
the US dollar and iShares MSCI emerging markets ETF. We expect to see that
during the tranquil periods, the Turkish short-term interest rate and the USD/TRY
exchange rate are both positively and significantly affected by the US short-term
interest rate and the emerging market risk premia. According to that, we expect to
see that short-term Turkish interest rate and the USD/TRY exchange rate increase
with the increasing short-term US interest rate and the emerging market risk
Figure 2.
Short-term interest rate of USA, short-term interest rate of Turkey and USD/TRY exchange rate.
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premia. However, during the politically stressed periods it is not possible to esti-
mate the relations between those variables as each political stress may have a
different impact according to their dynamics. For instance, while a fully domestic
political stress may cause Turkish financial markets to separate from the rest of the
world, a political stress that is caused by an international development may cause
Turkish markets to more sensitive to the external shocks.
“The vector autoregression (VAR) model is one of the most successful, flexible,
and easy to use models for the analysis of multivariate time series” ([27], p. 385).
It is a natural extension of the univariate autoregressive model to dynamic multi-
variate time series.1
Let Yt = (y1t, y2t, … , ynt)’ denote an (n  1) vector of time series variables. The
basic p-lag vector autoregressive model has the form;
Y t ¼ cþ Π1Y t1 þ Π2Y t2 þ … þþΠpY tp þ εt,  t ¼ 1, … ,T (2)
where Πi are (n  n) coefficient matrices and εt is an (n  1) unobservable zero
mean White noise vector process with time invariant covariance matrix Σ.
According to this, for example, a bivariate VAR(2) model equation by equation has
the form;
y1t ¼ c1 þ pi
1
11Y1t1 þ pi
1
12Y2t1 þ pi
1
11Y1t2 þ pi
2
12Y2t2 þ ε1t (3)
y2t ¼ c1 þ pi
1
21Y1t1 þ pi
1
22Y2t1 þ pi
1
21Y1t1 þ pi
2
22Y2t1 þ ε2t (4)
where cov(ε1t, ε2tÞ ¼ σ12. Each equation has the same regressors-lagged values of
y1t and y2t. Hence the VAR(p) model is just a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
model with lagged variables and deterministic terms as common regressors.
In lag operator notation, the VAR(p) is written as;
Π Lð ÞY t ¼ cþ εt (5)
where Π Lð Þ ¼ In  Π1L …  ΠpLp. The VAR(p) is stable if the roots of
Figure 3.
Emerging markets risk premia, short-term interest rate of Turkey and USD/TRY.
1 The theoretical presentation of vector autoregressive models that is used in the Methodology part is
taken from the book of Zivot and Wang [26].
6
Financial Crises
det In  Π1z …  Πpzp
 
¼ 0 (6)
lie outside the complex unit circle (have modulus greater than one), or, equiva-
lently, if the eigenvalues of the companion matrix have modules less than one.
Assuming that the process has been initialized in the infinite past, then a stable VAR
(p) process is stationary and ergodic with time invariant means, variances and
autocovariances.
If Y t is covariance stationary, then the unconditional mean is given by;
μ ¼ In  Π1  …  Πp
 1c (7)
The mean-adjusted form of the VAR(p) is then;
Y t  μ ¼ Π1 Y t1  μð Þ þ Π2 Y t2  μð Þ þ … þ Πp Y tp  μ
 
þ εt (8)
The general form of the VAR(p) model with deterministic terms and exogenous
variables is given by;
Y t ¼ Π1Y t1 þ Π2Y t2 þ … þ ΠpY tp þ ɸDt þGXt þ εt (9)
where Dt represents an (l  1) matrix of deterministic components, Xt repre-
sents an (m  1) matrix of exogenous variables, and ɸ and G are parameter
matrices.
To be able to estimate the basic VAR(p) model, each equation in the model can
be written as;
yi ¼ Zpii þ ei,  i ¼ 1, … , n (10)
where yi is a (T  1) vector of observations on the ith equation, Z is a (T  k)
matrix with tth row given by Z0t ¼ 1,Y
0
t1, … ,Y
0
tp
 
, k ¼ npþ 1, pii is a (k  1)
vector of parameters and ei is a (T  1) error with covariance matrix σ2i IT. Since the
VAR(p) is in the form of a SUR model where each equation has the same explana-
tory variables, each equation may be estimated separately by ordinary least squares
without losing efficiency relative to generalized least squares.
3. Results
In this study, to be able to show how the impact of external shocks on domestic
interest rates and the exchange rates change according to political stress in Turkey,
we construct a VAR model. Figure 4 plots interest rates and exchange rates in
Turkey over the period of 2011–2019. The politically stressed periods are
highlighted on this figure to show how domestic interest rates and exchange rates
react to political developments. Therefore, eight shaded lines on Figure 4 identify
the following major political crises in Turkey;
• 10 days period which starts with the early retirement request of commanders
of Turkish Army on 29th July 2011,
• 3 weeks period which starts with Gezi Park incidents on 28th May 2013,
• 1 month period which starts with the operation of FETO terror organization to
the government authorities on 17th December 2013,
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• 10 days period which starts on 31st July 2014 prior to presidential election,
• The period which starts with the 7th June 2015 general elections and continues
until the announcement of new elections on 25th August 2015,
• 2 weeks period which starts with the shootdown of Russian plane on Turkish
border on 24th November 2015,
• 2 weeks period which starts with the military coup attempt on 15th July 2016,
• 3 months period which starts with the announcement of new cabinet on 2nd
July 2018 and strengthens with Pastor Branson’s house arrest and ends with
Brunson’s return to USA.
Figure 4 presents the graphs of Turkish short-term interest rates and the USD/
TRY exchange rate for the period of 2011–2019. Figure 4 also highlights the political
stress periods to show how interest rate and exchange rate react to the political
stresses.
Figure 4 highlights the political stress periods to show how short-term interest
rates and the USD/TRY pair react to the political stresses. As it can be clearly seen
from the graph, most of the time political crises coincide with the sharp deprecia-
tion of the Turkish Lira against the US Dollar, while interest rates seem to react
shortly after the political crises. Political stress #8 which starts with the lawsuit of
Pastor Branson seems to have the most remarkable impact on Turkish interest rates
which causes a rise from around 17% to above 25%. According to Figure 4, Turkish
Lira significantly depreciates and short-term interest rates significantly increase in
the fourth quarter of 2011, the first quarter of 2017 and the fourth quarter of 2017.
However, as we did not identify any political crisis during those periods, we are not
in a position to relate these drastic moves with any political stress.
We use VAR analysis to model the behaviour of domestic interest rates and
nominal exchange rates. By doing so while our main target is detecting the impact
of external shocks on these variables, by identifying the major politically stress
periods we also aim to see how political stress makes changes on the impacts of
external factors on domestic interest rates and nominal exchange rates. From 1
Figure 4.
Short-term interest rates and spot exchange rate in Turkey.
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January 2011 to 31 December 2018, I estimate a VAR model including domestic
3-months interest rates, the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate against the US
Dollar, 3-months US interest rates and iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF. To
be able to eliminate the serial correlation in the residuals, we use a specification with
3 lags. By following ([16], p. 12) “in order to identify the impulse responses, errors
were orthogonalised by a Cholesky decomposition”.
3.1 The full period (January 1, 2011–December 31, 2018)
VAR test reveals that for the period of 2011–2019, Turkish short-term interest
rates and the USD/TRY exchange rate are not significantly affected by the US short-
term interest rates in the short run. However, after our preliminary analysis, we
increase the lag lengths to see if the US short-term interest rates have significant
impact on Turkish interest rates and the exchange rate in longer term. The results
reveal that while the exchange rate is not affected by the US short-term interest
rates even in longer term; with 10 days lag interval the US short-term interest rates
has a significant impact on the Turkish short-term interest rates at 90% confidence
level. Therefore, for the examined period, we conclude that while the US short-term
interest rates do not affect exchange rates in Turkey, Turkish short-term interest
rates show a significant positive response to the shocks from the US after 10 days.
When we examine the impact of emerging markets on Turkish short-term
interest rates and exchange rates we see that, emerging market risk premia has a
stronger effect compared to the short-term US interest rates. According to that, the
shocks coming from the emerging markets significantly affect the Turkish short-
term interest rates and USD/TRY in the first 2 days. Unlike the US short-term
interest rates, the impact of the emerging markets risk premia on the Turkish short-
term interest rates and Turkish exchange rate disappear in the longer term.
To be able to explain the general pattern of the response of Turkish short-term
interest rates and the exchange rate to the US short-term interest rates and the
emerging market risk premia we perform the impulse response functions.
Figure 5 presents the impulse response functions of short-term interest rates of
Turkey and USD/TRY exchange rate to the short-term interest rates of USA and the
emerging market risk premia.
Figure 5 shows the impulse response functions of USD/TRY and the Turkish
short-term interest rates to one percentage point US interest rate shock and emerg-
ing market risk premia shock. First, it is worth noting that the impact of the US
interest rate shock to the exchange rate reaches its peak after 1 week while the
impact of the US short-term interest rate shock to the Turkish short-term interest
rates reaches its peak after 10 days. The interesting point is, while the US interest
shocks affect Turkish exchange rate positively during the first 4 days, after the 4th
day it starts to have a negative impact. However, the estimated impact on the
exchange rate is not significantly different from zero during 10 days period,
confirming that the exchange rate in Turkey is not affected by the US interest rates.
The impact of the short-term US interest rates become significant on the short-term
interest rates of Turkey on the 10th day confirming that short-term interest rates
in Turkey are significantly affected by the US rates.
On the other hand, interest rate and the exchange rate react to emerging
market risk premia shocks in a different way. According to that, the Turkish
currency responds to emerging markets risk premia significantly and drastically
on the first few days with increasing trend after the fourth day while Turkish
short-term interest rate’s response deepens after the fourth day and reaches its
peak on the 9th day.
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3.2 The political stress #1 (July 29, 2011–August 11, 2011)
During the political stress #1 emerging markets risk premia significantly affects
both the USD/TRY pair and the Turkish short-term interest rates. The USD/TRY
pair responds significantly on the first day while short-term interest rate responds
to the shocks coming from emerging markets on both the first and the second days.
During this politically stressed period, while the US short-term interest rate
significantly affects the exchange rate on the second day, it has no significant
impact on the short-term interest rates on neither the first nor the second day.
3.3 The political stress #2 (May 28, 2013–June 20, 2013)
Results reveal that during the political stress #2, neither the Turkish short-term
interest rates nor the exchange rate in Turkey are significantly affected by both the
US short-term interest rates and the emerging market risk premia. Therefore, we
can clearly declare that the Gezi Park incidents cause Turkish capital markets to
enter an extra sensitive period to domestic developments while external shocks stop
affecting the short-term interest rates and the exchange rate. In other words, during
this stressed period, the short-term interest rates and the USD/TRY pair respond to
domestic shocks/news instead of external factors.
3.4 The political stress #3 (December 17, 2013–January 3, 2014)
During the politically stressed period #3, the Turkish Lira depreciates, Borsa
Istanbul crashes and interest rates rise significantly. VAR analysis reveals that the
reasons of these drastic moves are totally domestic. According to that, during that
Figure 5.
Impulse response functions: innovations  2 standard errors. Impact on interest rates and exchange rates (logs)
of percentage point shock to US interest rates and emerging markets risk.
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period, neither emerging market risk premia nor the US short-term interest rates
significantly affect the short-term interest rates and the exchange rates in Turkey.
3.5 The political stress #4 (July 31, 2014–August 15, 2014)
Prior to 2014 presidential election, Turkish money markets show instability
during a 10 days period. During that rather politically stressed period, Borsa Istan-
bul declines significantly and Turkish Lira depreciates. During this short period,
VAR analysis reveals that external shocks do not have any significant impacts on the
market. According to that, neither exchange rates nor interest rates respond to any
shocks from the US interest rates and the emerging markets.
3.6 The political stress #5 (June 7, 2015–August 25, 2015)
The fifth political stress has the same impact with the previous stresses as during
that period the external factors do not have any significant effect on the short-term
interest rates and the exchange rates of Turkey. According to that, during that
period, sharp depreciation of the Turkish Lira and the rise in the interest rates occur
due to domestic developments.
3.7 The political stress #6 (November 24, 2015–November 29, 2015)
The results reveal different conclusion regarding the impacts of the external
shocks during the politically stressed times for this specific incident. According
that, during the political stress that arises due to shootdown of Russian plane on
Turkish border, the Turkish currency is significantly affected by the short-term US
interest rates. During that period, Turkish currency significantly responds to the
changes on the US short-term interest rates in the first and the second days. During
that period, the exchange rate significantly responds to also the emerging risk
premia in the second day. However, Turkish short-term interest rates are not
significantly affected by any of those external factors during the stress period.
3.8 The political stress #7 (July 15, 2016–July 30, 2016)
After the military coup attempt, the exchange rate in Turkey starts to show
significant response to the shocks that are coming from the emerging markets.
During that period emerging risk premia has a significant impact on the short-term
interest rates too. Differently from the previous political stress, this time the US
short-term interest rates do not have any significant impact on the exchange rate.
However, this time, the Turkish short-term interest rate significantly responds to
the shocks coming from the US interest rates.
3.9 The political stress #8 (July 2, 2018–October 2, 2018)
Probably, in the last decade, Turkey has experienced the deepest financial stress
during this politically stress period. Right after Turkey and the USA start to have a
serious diplomatic crisis due to trial of Pastor Branson, the Turkish Lira drastically
depreciates and Turkish Central Bank has to increase the interest rates dramatically.
During that period, our results show that the Turkish Lira and the short-term
interest rates are not affected by the external shocks at all. As expected, during that
period domestic news play significant role on the value of the Turkish Lira and the
short-term interest rates.
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3.10 Politically tranquil periods with significant depreciation of Turkish Lira
and rise in interest rates
According to Figure 4, although we do not identify any political crisis, Turkish
Lira depreciates and short-term interest rate rises significantly during the fourth
quarter of 2011, the first quarter of 2017 and the fourth quarter of 2017. To be able
to understand the reasons of these changes, we run analysis specifically for these
periods. The results reveal that the changes on the short-term interest rates and the
exchange rate occur as a respond to the shocks from emerging markets in the fourth
quarter of 2011 and the fourth quarter of 2017 while the depreciation of the Turkish
Lira and the increase in interest rates in the first quarter of 2017 occur as a strong
respond to the shocks coming from the US short-term interest rates.
4. Conclusion
This chapter analyses the reaction of short-term interest rate and exchange rate
of Turkey to the external shocks and how this reaction changes according to
domestic political tension. For this purpose, the reaction of interest rates and
exchange rates to the American interest rate volatility and emerging market risk
factor is tested for the period of 2011–2019. During that period, we identified eight
major politically stressed periods that have significant negative impact on Turkish
money markets.
The primary result that we get from the VAR test for the period of 2011–2019 is
that Turkish short-term interest rates and the USD/TRY exchange rate are not
significantly affected by the US short-term interest rates in the short run. However,
Turkish short-term interest rates significantly respond to the US short-term interest
rates after 10 days. On the other hand, emerging market risk premia seems to be
much more important factor on Turkish short-term interest rates and the exchange
rate as during the 2011–2019 period, Turkish short-term interest rates and the
exchange rate significantly respond to the shocks coming from emerging markets in
the first 2 days.
If we sum up the impacts of each political stress period on the impacts of
external factors on the domestic interest rates and the exchange rate, we get a
blurred picture as it is difficult to generalize the impacts of political stresses.
According to that, while the political stress #1 and the political stress #7 do not
change how external factors affect the domestic interest rate and the exchange rate
as those keep significantly responding to emerging market risk premia and the
short-term US interest, during the political stresses #2, #3, #4, #5, and #8, neither
exchange rates nor interest rates respond to any shocks from the US interest rates
and the emerging markets. Therefore, we suggest that while the early retirement
request of commanders of Turkish Army and military coup attempt did not create
strong enough impact to change the pricing structure of Turkish assets and/or
perception of the investors; the Gezi Park incidents, the operation of FETO terror
organization to the government authorities, 2014 presidential election, 7th June
2015 general elections and afterward, and the announcement of new cabinet after
2018 elections and the Branson incident were strong enough to change the pricing
priorities of investors on Turkish risky assets. Following those developments,
domestic news seem to have more significant effect on the short-term interest rates
and the exchange rate compared to the external factors. Only during the political
stress period #6, shooting down of Russian plane, created mixed impact on the
external factors as during this period the Turkish currency significantly responded
to the US short-term interest rates in shorter period while it kept significantly
responding to the emerging market risk premia.
12
Financial Crises
The findings of this paper are quite important to understand how an emerging
country can deal or should deal with a possible financial shock/crisis. According to
this, the first and maybe the most important outcome of the study was that
although an emerging country is in a politically stressed situation, this stress’s
impact on the money markets change according to the dynamics of the situation.
While a fully domestic development may cause financial market to separate from
the rest of the world or the countries that is normally strongly integrated with,
another negative development that occurs due to foreign diplomatic issues might
have an opposite impact. Therefore, policy makers should primarily determine and
examine the reasons of a political tension to foresee the possible consequences in the
financial markets. For the Turkish case, this study clearly showed that while during
the tranquil periods Turkey is significantly integrated with both the US and the
emerging markets and any shocks from those markets significantly affect both
interest rates and the exchange rates, some political developments, especially army
and USA related ones, cause Turkey to negatively separate from those markets.
Secondly, this study quantitatively proved that the shocks that are originated from
the group of emerging markets significantly affect other emerging markets in very
short term while shocks from a developed country, USA in our case, show its
impacts in a longer term. In this case, policy makers should be aware of the danger
that instability of an emerging country may have a significant impact on their
financial markets very quickly. In other words, while an emerging country has
strong and healthy dynamics, a negative shock from other emerging countries may
also negatively and significantly affect that specific country in the first or second
day. Therefore, policy makers should be aware of the time periods while taking
precautions to the negative developments in other countries.
As a result, the findings of this chapter clearly prove that an emerging country is
open to financial shocks even if the country is politically tranquil due to significant
effects of the group of emerging markets and the USA. In case of a political stress,
on the other hand, the situation becomes more complicated as some of the political
crisis cause financial markets to react negatively internal news instead of external
shocks. Therefore, in emerging countries, investors and policy makers should
always consider political stability of the country, dynamics of the political tension
and the risk level of the group of emerging markets in the short term and the
changes in the short-term interest rates of USA in the rather longer term.
Appendix
See Tables 1–9.
Vector autoregression estimates
USD_TRY USA TR MSCI_EMERGING
USD_TRY(1) 1.239555 0.001096 0.149446 0.234697
(0.02242) (0.00351) (0.07595) (0.30998)
[55.2812] [0.31261] [1.96770] [0.75714]
USD_TRY(2) 0.428334 0.001819 0.434834 0.279474
(0.03463) (0.00541) (0.11729) (0.47870)
[12.3698] [0.33595] [3.70736] [0.58382]
USD_TRY(3) 0.188575 0.003611 0.244834 0.474752
(0.02251) (0.00352) (0.07624) (0.31118)
[8.37756] [1.02591] [3.21119] [1.52566]
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Vector autoregression estimates
USD_TRY USA TR MSCI_EMERGING
USA(1) 0.078956 0.973994 0.164896 1.484175
(0.13915) (0.02176) (0.47131) (1.92359)
[0.56743] [44.7690] [0.34987] [0.77157]
USA(2) 0.194843 0.189506 0.492364 0.445107
(0.19382) (0.03031) (0.65652) (2.67948)
[1.00526] [6.25325] [0.74996] [0.16612]
USA(3) 0.122793 0.162329 0.641158 1.137173
(0.13949) (0.02181) (0.47246) (1.92829)
[0.88032] [7.44312] [1.35705] [0.58973]
TR(1) 0.018625 0.001770 1.175840 0.003223
(0.00649) (0.00101) (0.02198) (0.08970)
[2.87047] [1.74446] [53.5019] [0.03593]
TR(2) 0.031462 0.001251 0.158691 0.110968
(0.00993) (0.00155) (0.03362) (0.13723)
[3.16940] [0.80626] [4.71967] [0.80864]
TR(3) 0.011875 0.000448 0.022727 0.112278
(0.00647) (0.00101) (0.02191) (0.08941)
[1.83610] [0.44281] [1.03744] [1.25577]
MSCI_EMERGING(1) 0.006609 0.000374 0.013413 0.950738
(0.00164) (0.00026) (0.00556) (0.02268)
[4.02779] [1.45922] [2.41343] [41.9154]
MSCI_EMERGING(2) 0.008802 6.42E-05 0.019646 0.033825
(0.00229) (0.00036) (0.00776) (0.03166)
[3.84306] [0.17935] [2.53237] [1.06829]
MSCI_EMERGING(3) 0.002344 0.000305 0.004392 0.004523
(0.00165) (0.00026) (0.00558) (0.02277)
[1.42275] [1.18279] [0.78721] [0.19864]
C 0.001672 0.000695 0.104660 0.530523
(0.01176) (0.00184) (0.03982) (0.16252)
[0.14220] [0.37831] [2.62837] [3.26443]
R-squared 0.998765 0.999927 0.999116 0.985729
Adj. R-squared 0.998758 0.999926 0.999111 0.985646
Sum sq. resids 2.957368 0.072297 33.92978 565.1823
S.E. equation 0.037798 0.005910 0.128028 0.522527
F-statistic 139543.2 2,358,791. 194978.8 11914.92
Log likelihood 3873.742 7739.029 1332.489 1597.100
Akaike AIC 3.706906 7.418175 1.266912 1.545943
Schwarz SC 3.671697 7.382966 1.231703 1.581152
Mean dependent 2.728274 0.738451 11.06632 40.88733
SD dependent 1.072606 0.689107 4.293795 4.361402
Sample (adjusted): 1/06/2011–12/31/2018.
Included observations: 2083 after adjustments.
Standard errors in () & t-statistics in [].
Table 1.
VAR estimates result for full period.
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Vector autoregression estimates
USD_TRY TR USA MSCI_EMERGING
USD_TRY(1) 0.872545 8.859426 0.060340 31.14791
(0.62071) (3.47853) (0.29360) (41.8594)
[1.40573] [2.54689] [0.20552] [0.74411]
USD_TRY(2) 0.308087 13.98951 0.103715 92.17556
(0.60804) (3.40756) (0.28761) (41.0055)
[0.50668] [4.10543] [0.36061] [2.24788]
TR(1) 0.021083 0.888519 0.005818 4.368654
(0.04691) (0.26291) (0.02219) (3.16377)
[0.44939] [3.37956] [0.26218] [1.38084]
TR(2) 0.127874 0.081052 0.029449 12.88844
(0.05263) (0.29492) (0.02489) (3.54897)
[2.42989] [0.27483] [1.18308] [3.63160]
USA(1) 1.360505 2.451433 0.474769 46.93249
(1.13015) (6.33354) (0.53457) (76.2157)
[1.20382] [0.38706] [0.88814] [0.61579]
USA(2) 1.357323 27.54796 0.247523 32.81856
(1.41483) (7.92892) (0.66922) (95.4140)
[0.95935] [3.47437] [0.36987] [0.34396]
MSCI_EMERGING(1) 0.013139 0.090067 0.001294 0.300612
(0.00716) (0.04014) (0.00339) (0.48306)
[1.83430] [2.24372] [0.38187] [0.62231]
MSCI_EMERGING(2) 0.002236 0.142830 0.002761 0.051437
(0.00847) (0.04748) (0.00401) (0.57139)
[0.26393] [3.00808] [0.68888] [0.09002]
C 1.753591 41.44923 0.239769 391.0476
(2.30845) (12.9369) (1.09191) (155.678)
[0.75964] [3.20396] [0.21959] [2.51190]
R-squared 0.981377 0.991826 0.951979 0.986179
Adj. R-squared 0.906885 0.959132 0.759893 0.930895
Sum sq. resids 0.000261 0.008212 5.85E-05 1.189129
S.E. equation 0.011434 0.064077 0.005408 0.771080
F-statistic 13.17424 30.33649 4.956014 17.83851
Log likelihood 42.95073 23.99218 51.18588 3.372616
Akaike AIC 6.172859 2.725851 7.670159 2.249567
Schwarz SC 5.847309 2.400300 7.344609 2.575117
Mean dependent 1.741182 8.368442 0.272727 42.97664
SD dependent 0.037470 0.316965 0.011037 2.933228
Sample: 7/29/2011–8/12/2011.
Included observations: 11.
Standard errors in () & t-statistics in [].
Table 2.
VAR estimates result for political stress #1.
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Vector autoregression estimates
USD_TRY TR USA MSCI_EMERGING
USD_TRY(1) 1.045822 1.551895 0.082439 16.61406
(0.35577) (3.63916) (0.07309) (17.9657)
[2.93957] [0.42644] [1.12787] [0.92477]
USD_TRY(2) 0.592774 0.541974 0.086876 4.068066
(0.38266) (3.91418) (0.07862) (19.3234)
[1.54909] [0.13846] [1.10506] [0.21053]
TR(1) 0.000282 0.879367 0.015476 1.021491
(0.03042) (0.31120) (0.00625) (1.53631)
[0.00926] [2.82575] [2.47605] [0.66490]
TR(2) 0.020745 0.085642 0.007593 1.961514
(0.02836) (0.29005) (0.00583) (1.43189)
[0.73162] [0.29527] [1.30335] [1.36988]
USA(1) 1.896724 18.28130 0.244931 19.59458
(1.23033) (12.5849) (0.25277) (62.1287)
[1.54164] [1.45264] [0.96899] [0.31539]
USA(2) 0.351707 15.14300 0.055503 52.90086
(1.28545) (13.1487) (0.26409) (64.9120)
[0.27361] [1.15167] [0.21017] [0.81496]
MSCI_EMERGING(1) 0.006059 0.069716 0.002865 0.531484
(0.00809) (0.08272) (0.00166) (0.40836)
[0.74921] [0.84281] [1.72434] [1.30151]
MSCI_EMERGING(2) 0.011379 0.007283 0.003909 0.024268
(0.00942) (0.09636) (0.00194) (0.47571)
[1.20785] [0.07558] [2.01978] [0.05101]
C 0.270639 8.592797 0.095488 68.32132
(0.88691) (9.07206) (0.18221) (44.7866)
[0.30515] [0.94717] [0.52404] [1.52549]
R-squared 0.779097 0.964512 0.648236 0.870906
Adj. R-squared 0.602375 0.936121 0.366825 0.767630
Sum sq. resids 0.002105 0.220288 8.89E-05 5.368774
S.E. equation 0.014510 0.148421 0.002981 0.732719
F-statistic 4.408603 33.97284 2.303518 8.432841
Log likelihood 59.56320 15.38413 89.63188 14.95336
Akaike AIC 5.322442 0.672013 8.487566 2.521406
Schwarz SC 4.875076 0.224648 8.040200 2.968772
Mean dependent 1.884921 5.980695 0.271579 40.16632
SD dependent 0.023011 0.587241 0.003746 1.520014
Sample: 5/28/2013–6/21/2013.
Included observations: 19.
Standard errors in () & t-statistics in [].
Table 3.
VAR estimates result for political stress #2.
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Vector autoregression estimates
USD_TRY TR USA MSCI_EMERGING
USD_TRY(1) 0.252091 4.905135 0.100362 3.579565
(1.02806) (3.21845) (0.17927) (6.53266)
[0.24521] [1.52407] [0.55983] [0.54795]
USD_TRY(2) 0.294757 8.237847 0.007630 20.28858
(1.42700) (4.46736) (0.24884) (9.06764)
[0.20656] [1.84401] [0.03066] [2.23747]
TR(1) 0.108817 0.159976 0.025424 1.179018
(0.15216) (0.47636) (0.02653) (0.96690)
[0.71513] [0.33583] [0.95816] [1.21938]
TR(2) 0.043346 0.073717 0.004355 0.396928
(0.06720) (0.21036) (0.01172) (0.42699)
[0.64507] [0.35042] [0.37162] [0.92960]
USA(1) 4.359186 6.880054 1.223262 8.315462
(5.69159) (17.8181) (0.99249) (36.1663)
[0.76590] [0.38613] [1.23251] [0.22992]
USA(2) 4.603798 12.52887 1.557584 176.5719
(10.1715) (31.8428) (1.77369) (64.6331)
[0.45262] [0.39346] [0.87816] [2.73191]
MSCI_EMERGING(1) 0.042445 0.279831 0.012791 1.229423
(0.07507) (0.23500) (0.01309) (0.47700)
[0.56543] [1.19075] [0.97716] [2.57741]
MSCI_EMERGING(2) 0.076973 0.263341 0.010266 0.595434
(0.06557) (0.20527) (0.01143) (0.41664)
[1.17394] [1.28292] [0.89786] [1.42913]
C 0.504984 14.32025 0.366730 64.21933
(2.80039) (8.76691) (0.48833) (17.7947)
[0.18033] [1.63344] [0.75099] [3.60891]
R-squared 0.944309 0.994128 0.799905 0.977004
Adj. R-squared 0.498785 0.947151 0.800856 0.793032
Sum sq. resids 0.000592 0.005804 1.80E05 0.023913
S.E. equation 0.024336 0.076186 0.004244 0.154638
F-statistic 2.119544 21.16193 0.499703 5.310618
Log likelihood 34.48162 23.06937 51.94686 15.99023
Akaike AIC 5.096325 2.813875 8.589371 1.398046
Schwarz SC 4.823998 2.541548 8.317045 1.125720
Mean dependent 2.093070 8.858114 0.249000 40.94500
SD dependent 0.034374 0.331400 0.003162 0.339910
Sample: 12/17/2013–12/30/2013.
Included observations: 10.
Standard errors in () & t-statistics in [].
Table 4.
VAR estimates result for political stress #3.
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Vector autoregression estimates
USD_TRY TR USA MSCI_EMERGING
USD_TRY(1) 0.519237 5.242203 0.018683 12.66113
(0.53772) (8.59526) (0.07212) (28.5601)
[0.96563] [0.60989] [0.25906] [0.44332]
USD_TRY(2) 0.521707 3.284314 0.116449 34.40483
(0.38776) (6.19818) (0.05201) (20.5951)
[1.34546] [0.52988] [2.23911] [1.67053]
TR(1) 0.033199 0.584900 0.002042 1.450924
(0.02810) (0.44925) (0.00377) (1.49274)
[1.18128] [1.30196] [0.54171] [0.97198]
TR(2) 0.024623 0.209647 0.007635 0.635585
(0.03095) (0.49468) (0.00415) (1.64371)
[0.79564] [0.42380] [1.83935] [0.38668]
USA(1) 2.852733 1.444260 0.348541 65.70581
(2.87562) (45.9662) (0.38569) (152.735)
[0.99204] [0.03142] [0.90369] [0.43019]
USA(2) 1.643630 56.99025 0.609977 39.20152
(2.56418) (40.9878) (0.34391) (136.193)
[0.64100] [1.39042] [1.77363] [0.28784]
MSCI_EMERGING(1) 0.009292 0.051124 0.001046 1.098503
(0.01213) (0.19387) (0.00163) (0.64419)
[0.76609] [0.26370] [0.64291] [1.70524]
MSCI_EMERGING(2) 0.012677 0.037399 0.002046 0.335273
(0.01016) (0.16248) (0.00136) (0.53989)
[1.24711] [0.23017] [1.50076] [0.62100]
C 3.995803 30.06631 0.974848 107.8384
(2.68089) (42.8534) (0.35957) (142.392)
[1.49048] [0.70161] [2.71117] [0.75733]
R-squared 0.893257 0.940998 0.955591 0.778050
Adj. R-squared 0.608608 0.783658 0.837167 0.186182
Sum sq. resids 0.000172 0.043909 3.09E06 0.484785
S.E. equation 0.007568 0.120980 0.001015 0.401989
F-statistic 3.138103 5.980680 8.069210 1.314567
Log likelihood 49.89570 16.63606 74.00372 2.226473
Akaike AIC 6.815950 1.272677 10.83395 1.128921
Schwarz SC 6.452270 0.908997 10.47027 1.492601
Mean dependent 2.151733 9.187219 0.234792 44.07875
SD dependent 0.012098 0.260102 0.002516 0.445605
Sample: 7/31/2014–8/15/2014.
Included observations: 12.
Standard errors in () & t-statistics in [].
Table 5.
VAR estimates result for political stress #4.
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Vector autoregression estimates
USD_TRY TR USA MSCI_EMERGING
USD_TRY(1) 0.708805 0.249663 0.034715 2.442156
(0.16209) (0.45042) (0.02559) (3.85036)
[4.37278] [0.55429] [1.35656] [0.63427]
USD_TRY(2) 0.122357 0.043897 0.025023 1.655415
(0.16238) (0.45120) (0.02564) (3.85707)
[0.75354] [0.09729] [0.97614] [0.42919]
TR(1) 0.004405 0.903572 0.009074 2.033973
(0.05723) (0.15902) (0.00903) (1.35938)
[0.07697] [5.68205] [1.00429] [1.49625]
TR(2) 0.064607 0.116529 0.001492 0.684540
(0.05883) (0.16348) (0.00929) (1.39745)
[1.09819] [0.71282] [0.16062] [0.48985]
USA(1) 0.329242 1.942183 0.669188 15.31464
(1.00376) (2.78919) (0.15847) (23.8431)
[0.32801] [0.69633] [4.22288] [0.64231]
USA(2) 0.969726 0.107627 0.224866 24.57049
(1.01086) (2.80893) (0.15959) (24.0118)
[0.95930] [0.03832] [1.40904] [1.02327]
MSCI_EMERGING(1) 0.009986 0.010206 0.000254 0.938702
(0.00657) (0.01826) (0.00104) (0.15607)
[1.51989] [0.55900] [0.24527] [6.01475]
MSCI_EMERGING(2) 0.009639 0.019322 0.001503 0.141877
(0.00673) (0.01869) (0.00106) (0.15978)
[1.43299] [1.03376] [1.41540] [0.88797]
C 0.880645 0.680372 0.173718 23.55633
(0.46135) (1.28196) (0.07283) (10.9587)
[1.90886] [0.53073] [2.38512] [2.14956]
R-squared 0.945737 0.897486 0.968769 0.962453
Adj. R-squared 0.936693 0.880401 0.963564 0.956195
Sum sq. resids 0.019811 0.152969 0.000494 11.17816
S.E. equation 0.020316 0.056452 0.003207 0.482575
F-statistic 104.5732 52.52882 186.1174 153.7995
Log likelihood 146.1108 87.85686 251.3305 34.45046
Akaike AIC 4.810905 2.766907 8.502823 1.524577
Schwarz SC 4.488318 2.444320 8.180236 1.847164
Mean dependent 2.743363 11.41014 0.297242 37.78491
SD dependent 0.080744 0.163236 0.016803 2.305703
Sample: 6/08/2015 8/25/2015.
Included observations: 57.
Standard errors in () & t-statistics in [].
Table 6.
VAR estimates result for political stress #5.
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Vector autoregression estimates
USD_TRY TR USA MSCI_EMERGING
USD_TRY(1) 0.208853 0.554838 0.258267 7.360014
(0.21444) (0.27058) (0.20349) (13.1649)
[0.97393] [2.05054] [1.26918] [0.55906]
USD_TRY(2) 0.028340 0.576283 0.151205 10.63891
(0.26409) (0.33322) (0.25060) (16.2126)
[0.10731] [1.72944] [0.60337] [0.65621]
TR(1) 0.847586 0.133623 0.028234 17.66526
(0.41552) (0.52430) (0.39430) (25.5093)
[2.03980] [0.25486] [0.07161] [0.69250]
TR(2) 0.471574 0.045990 0.110749 0.187963
(0.36342) (0.45856) (0.34486) (22.3107)
[1.29759] [0.10029] [0.32114] [0.00842]
USA(1) 2.406126 0.632717 1.249959 80.84426
(1.16439) (1.46920) (1.10491) (71.4826)
[2.06643] [0.43065] [1.13127] [1.13096]
USA(2) 3.931361 0.807797 0.060307 66.93084
(1.29648) (1.63587) (1.23026) (79.5917)
[3.03234] [0.49380] [0.04902] [0.84093]
MSCI_EMERGING(1) 0.010020 0.008902 0.004755 0.659546
(0.01389) (0.01753) (0.01318) (0.85275)
[0.72132] [0.50792] [0.36075] [0.77344]
MSCI_EMERGING(2) 0.035343 0.011427 0.000584 0.064169
(0.01135) (0.01432) (0.01077) (0.69677)
[3.11402] [0.79790] [0.05422] [0.09210]
C 15.00712 11.04252 0.880388 315.4749
(5.87354) (7.41108) (5.57353) (360.580)
[2.55504] [1.49000] [0.15796] [0.87491]
R-squared 0.976238 0.940271 0.993659 0.937157
Adj. R-squared 0.881190 0.701355 0.968296 0.685786
Sum sq. resids 6.20E05 9.86E05 5.58E05 0.233487
S.E. equation 0.005566 0.007023 0.005281 0.341677
F-statistic 10.27098 3.935577 39.17780 3.728184
Log likelihood 50.87040 48.31268 51.44711 5.580570
Akaike AIC 7.612800 7.147761 7.717657 0.621715
Schwarz SC 7.287250 6.822210 7.392107 0.947265
Mean dependent 2.900682 11.35010 0.435164 34.01700
SD dependent 0.016147 0.012850 0.029661 0.609542
Sample: 11/24/2015–12/08/2015.
Included observations: 11.
Standard errors in () & t-statistics in [].
Table 7.
VAR estimates result for political stress #6.
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Vector autoregression estimates
USD_TRY TR USA MSCI_EMERGING
USD_TRY(1) 0.037991 1.379474 0.026738 1.548057
(0.15992) (0.37246) (0.03780) (1.29406)
[0.23756] [3.70373] [0.70742] [1.19628]
USD_TRY(2) 0.664323 0.991110 0.007986 2.964535
(0.21112) (0.49171) (0.04990) (1.70841)
[3.14659] [2.01564] [0.16005] [1.73526]
TR(1) 0.162109 0.281267 0.021652 1.083173
(0.09284) (0.21622) (0.02194) (0.75124)
[1.74614] [1.30083] [0.98678] [1.44184]
TR(2) 0.048103 0.104220 0.013276 0.898872
(0.07228) (0.16834) (0.01708) (0.58489)
[0.66551] [0.61910] [0.77712] [1.53684]
USA(1) 2.328077 12.13171 1.062720 14.50641
(1.90754) (4.44268) (0.45085) (15.4357)
[1.22046] [2.73072] [2.35717] [0.93980]
USA(2) 2.262053 13.16730 0.004139 7.328605
(1.82020) (4.23925) (0.43020) (14.7289)
[1.24275] [3.10604] [0.00962] [0.49757]
MSCI_EMERGING(1) 0.116796 0.068353 0.010143 0.187650
(0.04461) (0.10390) (0.01054) (0.36098)
[2.61818] [0.65790] [0.96199] [0.51984]
MSCI_EMERGING(2) 0.023493 0.263795 0.004722 0.082381
(0.03527) (0.08215) (0.00834) (0.28544)
[0.66601] [3.21096] [0.56636] [0.28861]
C 6.501998 5.274677 0.351928 42.78517
(2.04631) (4.76587) (0.48364) (16.5586)
[3.17743] [1.10676] [0.72766] [2.58386]
R-squared 0.855084 0.959389 0.991451 0.725483
Adj. R-squared 0.661862 0.905240 0.980052 0.359461
Sum sq. resids 0.002215 0.012015 0.000124 0.145044
S.E. equation 0.019214 0.044750 0.004541 0.155480
F-statistic 4.425407 17.71779 86.97880 1.982072
Log likelihood 44.86974 32.18810 66.50640 13.50670
Akaike AIC 4.782632 3.091747 7.667519 0.600893
Schwarz SC 4.357802 2.666916 7.242689 0.176063
Mean dependent 3.025113 9.883607 0.729647 35.91900
SD dependent 0.033043 0.145372 0.032153 0.194268
Sample: 7/15/2016–8/04/2016.
Included observations: 15.
Standard errors in () & t-statistics in [].
Table 8.
VAR estimates result for political stress #7.
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Vector autoregression estimates
USD_TRY TR USA MSCI_EMERGING
USD_TRY(1) 1.112781 0.296064 0.009584 0.251992
(0.14951) (0.30256) (0.00484) (0.38034)
[7.44288] [0.97852] [1.97877] [0.66254]
USD_TRY(2) 0.203608 0.660003 0.004431 0.652522
(0.14567) (0.29479) (0.00472) (0.37057)
[1.39776] [2.23891] [0.93908] [1.76088]
TR(1) 0.129738 1.050609 0.000190 0.234949
(0.06417) (0.12986) (0.00208) (0.16324)
[2.02184] [8.09048] [0.09140] [1.43930]
TR(2) 0.100454 0.143475 0.002212 0.448261
(0.06676) (0.13511) (0.00216) (0.16984)
[1.50463] [1.06192] [1.02261] [2.63932]
USA(1) 3.823444 4.286335 0.804341 9.608025
(4.55697) (9.22198) (0.14762) (11.5926)
[0.83903] [0.46480] [5.44863] [0.82881]
USA(2) 1.561428 12.25069 0.093564 4.784711
(4.43729) (8.97979) (0.14375) (11.2881)
[0.35189] [1.36425] [0.65090] [0.42387]
MSCI_EMERGING(1) 0.085443 0.064802 0.000532 0.614351
(0.05032) (0.10183) (0.00163) (0.12800)
[1.49812] [0.63640] [0.32661] [4.79958]
MSCI_EMERGING(2) 0.021460 0.075181 0.001042 0.162597
(0.05144) (0.10409) (0.00167) (0.13085)
[0.41721] [0.72225] [0.62550] [1.24262]
C 2.387621 18.00681 0.193460 43.62729
(4.73605) (9.58438) (0.15342) (12.0481)
[0.50414] [1.87877] [1.26095] [3.62108]
R-squared 0.954022 0.986646 0.949950 0.831893
Adj. R-squared 0.947681 0.984804 0.943046 0.808706
Sum sq. resids 1.615137 6.614623 0.001695 10.45240
S.E. equation 0.166875 0.337706 0.005406 0.424516
F-statistic 150.4354 535.6535 137.6044 35.87724
Log likelihood 29.72776 17.50265 259.5212 32.83053
Akaike AIC 0.618739 0.791124 7.478245 1.248673
Schwarz SC 0.322587 1.087277 7.182093 1.544825
Mean dependent 5.668028 22.54157 2.338678 43.14940
SD dependent 0.729557 2.739510 0.022652 0.970606
Sample: 7/02/2018–10/02/2018.
Included observations: 67.
Standard errors in () & t-statistics in [].
Table 9.
VAR estimates result for political stress #8.
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